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Ethical Considerations 
in the Care of the Dying Patient 
and the Hospice Concept 
David C. Thomasma, Ph.D. 
The author is director, Medicine and Humanities, Loyola University 
Stritch School of Medicine. 
As concern for care for the dying increases, including hospice care, 
it is important to examine some of the ethical considerations included 
in this concern and its implementation. There are three areas of con-
sideration - first, ethical obligations which stem from the profession 
of medicine toward the dying; second, ethical problems which arise in 
attempting to secure those obligations toward individual patients; 
third, ethical features of providing social policy for the care of the 
dying, particularly the development of adequate hospice programs. I 
will briefly examine each of these. 
Ethical Obligations Toward the Dying 
Insofar as we are all members of society, all of us participate in 
I, general obligations of justice toward those in need. 1 In addition, those 
professing religious compassion have the urgings of charity which 
emphasize the obligations of justice. However, health professionals 
have additional ethical obligations to care for the living and the dying 
which stem from their profession to heal. 2 
Healing is a value which infuses the health care/patient relationship. 
The health care professional commits himself to this value by acting 
on behalf of the patient, not with respect to all the values of the 
patient, but with respect to health. The patient commits himself to 
this care, to the many indignities and passivities of the relationship, 
because he or she also values health and healing. 
Among the obligations which arise from this relationship to patients 
\ for the health professional are the following: 1) do no harm; 2) 
respect the vulnerability of the patient; 3) treat each patient as a class 
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instance of the human race, without attention to his or her economic, 
social and political standing. 3 
It is important to remember that the patient's need for the skills of 
the health professional with respect to healing is the very lifeblood of 
the relationship. As the patient's need increases, so too does the inten-
sity of the three ethical obligations cited above. 4 Thus one might 
consider turning away a destitute patient with a minor cut on the 
finger, but health professionals must treat dying patients (obligation 
no. 3 ). 
The major ethical consideration in this category, therefore, stems 
both from the dying patient's need for the skills health professionals 
can provide and for the shifting notion of healing operative in the 
relationship. With major diseases such as cancer and heart trouble it is 
never absolutely clear that a crisis will lead to death at this time. 
Although health professionals continue to respond to the needs of 
their patients in terms of "making them comfortable" or otherwise 
offering palliative measures such as new chemotherapeutic combina-
tions or pain suppression operations, the operative notion of healing 
has switched from possible cure of the disease to providing several 
good months. 
However, what the patient may now need is a broader conception 
of healing than cure, palliative measures, or pain-killing drugs. 
Although these should not be ruled out, the ethical obligation to heal 
now requires the health professional to ask some disturbing questions. 
Am I now, at this point in disease progression, merely prolonging life 
needlessly, adding to the pain and agony of the patient and family? 
What is the healing thing to do at this point? If I do not exercise some 
of my skills, am I abandoning the patient? 
Most ethicists would agree with Paul Ramsey's view that the obliga-
tion to heal, in the case of the dying patient, does not mean to 
needlessly prolong life. Instead the obligation now turns, as the 
patient clearly deteriorates, to providing a decent death. 5 This pro-
vision leads to the second class of ethical considerations. 
Ethical Considerations for Individual Patients 
I discussed above a health professional's general obligations toward 
dying patients. The real ethical problems occur, however, in trying to 
carry out these obligations for individual patients. If the obligation to 
heal no longer means to employ the general medical armamentarium 
useful for combating disease, what specific measures should be 
selected, withheld, and discontinued? Of course this is not only a 
medical question but also an ethical one because it is asked in the 
context of obligations toward the patient. 
Each case varies. But the common ethical problems involving dying 
patients include selecting extraordinary means to preserve life, 6 
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withholding some measures including those normally considered 
ordinary means, and discontinuing both ordinary and extraordinary 
measures. Let us look at these three actions in reverse order. 
Physicians are less apt to discontinue a measure once begun than 
not to order it. This reluctance stems from the engagement with the 
patient created by these measures and their identification with pro-
viding for the patient's needs. In light of the above discussion on 
healing, however, neither ordinary nor extraordinary means need to be 
continued to carry out one's obligations when a dying patient or 
family member requests discontinuance. Not only respirators and 
other "heroic" measures, but also IV's and antibiotics fall under this 
consideration. 
Withholding extraordinary means can depend on patient or family 
requests, living wills, or a no-code contract with the patient.7 With-
holding ordinary means, such as IV fluids, antibiotics, or even the 
respirator if it is being used to adjust drug dosages for seizures and the 
like, is far more problematic. The same holds true for selecting some 
measures rather than others. The patient and family may not be the 
best judges of the current stage of the disease. These judgments will 
depend on the history of the disease, therapies already tried and 
failed, patient values about the true nature of healing, and the doctor's 
judgment. 
Thus, if a patient has agreed to work for "some good months," and 
clinical indicators do not reveal whether a current crisis may be the 
last, the doctor should select everything available at his command, 
mindful of the difficulty of discontinuing therapy once the crisis is 
revealed as terminal. If the patient has opted for quitting, a severe 
injustice is done to order extraordinary measures, though ordinary 
means are still required until the crisis is judged not only irreversible, 
but terminal. If a patient has explicitly asked to be allowed to die, 
especially after a year or two of frequent hospitalizations, remissions 
and relapses, this wish must be taken seriously even though the doctor 
may think he could prolong the patient's life a few more months. 
Given the emphasis on cure in medical training and the technolog-
ical capacity of modem medicine, withholding therapy seems incon-
sistent with the goals of health care. However, serious reflection on 
the needs of the patient who is dying and the nature of the healing 
obligation can offer some moral guidelines to those who care for dying 
patients. 
Ethical Basis of Hospice 
The hospice, whether home health care-based or hospital-based or 
both, rests on the same fundamental moral principle as does the 
doctor-patient relationship and should be viewed as an extension of 
November, 1982 343 
the relationship. Thus, it is based on patient need for healing and, at 
least partially, on health care obligation to provide that healing. By 
definition one is not referred to hospice care unless he or she is suffer-
ing an irreversible tenninal disease in its end stages. No more than six 
months of further life are anticipated.s 
Hospice care should not be viewed as an alternative to health care, 
but rather, as a supplement. If it is construed in the former fashion, 
the prior bond between doctor and patient is ruptured. Referral to 
hospice would appear in the doctor's mind as abandoning a long-term 
patient rather than as supplementing the medical needs of the patient 
with other needs modern medicine cannot provide. Among these 
needs are a family environment (at home or in specially designed care 
institutions), legal, spiritual, economic and social support. Of course, 
these are major needs. However, they, too, fall under the rubric of 
healing that infuses the health care/patient relationship as well. If 
viewed in this way, hospice care is an extension of health care and 
shares its moral basis. The patient still needs the palliative measures 
medicine can provide and will need extensive individual attention for 
problems of pain, mobility, anxiety, and bed care. Being under 
hospice care will diminish the two fears patients have about dying - a 
fear of abandonment and a fear of sudden catastrophe. 9 
With respect to physician obligations toward the patient discussed 
in the first two sections, hospice referral can resolve many of the 
ethical dilemmas faced when caring for dying patients in traditional 
environments. One has been mentioned already. Such referral does 
not mean abandoning the patient or bouncing .him back to a nursing 
home to be seen again in the emergency room when another crisis 
develops. The physician still manages the patient's case. The general 
obligations to do no harm, respect the vulnerability of the patient, and 
treat each patient as a unique person are fulfilled in hospice care. 
Specific ethical decisions about medical treatment are also made in 
advance, so to speak, because such referral with patient or family 
consent means that no further medical interventions will be 
attempted, except perhaps, pain control surgery. Truth-telling prob-
lems are avoided. Hospice patients and their families know they are 
dying. 
Most of all, hospice care can lend some much-needed reality to the 
obligation to provide for a "decent death" discussed in the first sec-
tion. In normal hospital circumstances a "decent death" can still be 
misconstrued as one filled with heroic measures and resuscitation 
attempts. The family is often absent as hospital patients so treated die 
in pieces, as it were, one organ system failing after another. If, indeed, 
health care professionals do have an obligation to heal dying patients 
by providing a decent or dignified death, then hospice referral is the 
best current means to insure that that obligation is carried out. 
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Conclusion 
I have deliberately avoided a discussion of economic and pragmatic 
ends in the care of dying patients, not to neglect their importance as 
well, but to highlight the moral obligations attendant on health care 
professionals and the health care system in treating dying patients. 
Attention to the healing value of the doctor/patient relationship and 
the patient's growing need for healing when health becomes impos-
sible can provide the moral basis of special duties toward the dying. 
While all of us share in these duties as a matter of justice and charity, 
health care professionals have more intensive obligations toward the 
dying based on their commitment to heal. 
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